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1 Introduction
Market impact, i.e. the interplay between order flow and price dynamics, has in-
creasingly attracted the attention of researchers and of the industry in the last years
(Bouchaud et al. [2008]). Despite its importance, both from a fundamental point
of view (due to its relation with supply-demand) and from an applied point of view
(due to its relation with transaction cost analysis and optimal execution), market
impact is not yet fully understood and different models and approaches have been
proposed and empirically tested.
It is important to note that market impact refers to different aspects of this in-
terplay and that they should be carefully distinguished (see Bouchaud et al. [2008]
for a discussion). First, there is the impact of an individual trade or of the aggre-
gated signed1 order flow in a fixed time period. Second, especially for transaction
cost analysis and optimal execution, it is more interesting to consider the impact of
a large trade (sometimes termed as meta-order) executed incrementally by the same
investor with many transactions and orders over a given interval of time. Both these
definitions of market impact are typically investigated by considering one asset at
a time, i.e. without considering the effect of a trade (or of an order) in one asset
on the price dynamics of another asset.
This is the third type of impact, that we study in this paper, and that is termed
cross-impact. Understanding and modeling cross-impact is important for many
reasons, since it enters naturally in problems like optimal execution of portfolios,
statistical arbitrage of a set of assets, and to study the relation between correlation
in prices and correlation in order flows. Conceptually, while self-impact, the impact
of a trade on the price of the same asset, can qualitatively be understood as the
result of a mechanical component (e.g. a market order with volume larger than the
volume at the opposite best) and an induced component (resilience of the order book
due to liquidity replenishment), the source of cross-impact is less clear. On one side
if a trader is liquidating simultaneously two assets one can obviously expect a non-
vanishing cross-impact. Since impact measures are typically averages across many
measurements, this mechanism produces cross-impact if simultaneous trades and
positively correlated order flow are frequently observed. On the other side, liquidity
providers and arbitrageurs detect local mispricing between correlated assets and bet
on a reversion to normality by placing orders. In other words this induced cross-
impact relates to the possibility of identifying price changes due to local imbalances
of supply-demand in one asset (rather than to fundamental information) and of
exploiting the possibly short-lived mispricing between correlated assets.
Even though cross-impact has already been discussed e.g. in Almgren and Chriss
[2001] as an extension of their optimal execution model and in Hasbrouck and Seppi
[2001] in a principal component approach, it has only recently been the subject of
extensive empirical studies. Pasquariello and Vega [2013] empirically show that
order imbalance has a significant impact on returns across stocks and sectors at
the daily scale. Wang et al. [2016a,b] present evidence for a structured price cross-
response and correlated order flow at the intraday time-scale across stock pairs.
Benzaquen et al. [2017] link cross-response and order flow in a multivariate extension
of the Transient Impact Model (TIM) of Bouchaud et al. [2004] and show that their
1Conventionally buyer (seller) initiated trades have positive (negative) volume and order sign.
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model can reproduce a significant part of the well-known correlation structure of
asset returns. Mastromatteo et al. [2017] exploits this link between correlation
and cross-impact, showing that cross-impact is crucial for a correct estimation of
liquidity when trading portfolios. Wang and Guhr [2016] perform a scenario analysis
in a model similar to Benzaquen et al. [2017], finding that cross-response is related
both to cross-impact and correlated order flow across assets.
It is clear that the cross-impact problem talks naturally to dynamic arbitrage
and to the possibility of price manipulation, as already discussed in Huberman
and Stanzl [2004]. It is therefore natural to ask which constraints the no-price-
manipulation assumption imposes on market impact models. There is a large liter-
ature on this problem, often focused on the single asset case (Huberman and Stanzl
[2004], Gatheral [2010], Alfonsi et al. [2012], Gatheral and Schied [2013], Curato
et al. [2016, 2017]).
In the multi-asset case many articles are concerned with strategies for optimal
portfolio liquidation in the presence of volatility risk by expanding the model of
Almgren [2003]. Schied et al. [2010] show that optimal execution strategies for in-
vestors with constant absolute risk aversion are deterministic and for a more general
absolute risk aversion setting Scho¨neborn [2016] finds that the optimal strategies
for investors with different risk preferences vary only in the speed of their execu-
tion. The case of cross-impact in a lit market when there is also a dark pool is
discussed in Kratz and Scho¨neborn [2015]. Tsoukalas et al. [2017] instead develop
a limit order book model with cross-impact and find that it can be optimal to tem-
porarily take up positions contrary to the direction of one’s trading intent. The
paper most related to ours from a theoretical point of view is Alfonsi et al. [2016].
They model multi-asset price impact by considering a linear version of the model
of Gatheral [2010], extending thus the model already considered in Alfonsi et al.
[2012]. They show that the absence of no-dynamic-arbitrage on a discrete-time grid
corresponds to the decay kernel being described by a positive definite matrix-valued
function. Furthermore they formulate further conditions to ensure that resulting
optimal strategies are well-behaved, both in discrete and continuous time, and show
how such kernels can be constructed. However it is not generally straightforward to
establish positive definiteness when a decay kernel is obtained coordinate-wise from
estimations and therefore necessary conditions for the absence of dynamic arbitrage
that can be verified on estimated decay kernels prove useful.
In this paper, focusing on the TIM framework in continuous time, we establish
some easily verifiable necessary conditions that must be satisfied by self- and cross-
impact, in order to avoid the presence of price manipulation. We do this in the same
spirit of Gatheral [2010] by explicitly constructing trading strategies that lead to
price manipulation and negative expected cost. Some of these relations are simple
generalizations to the multi-asset case of the corresponding relations for the single
asset case derived in Gatheral [2010]. Other relations that we derive here are instead
genuinely relative to the multi-asset case. In particular we formalize in Lemma 3.9
that cross-impact must be symmetric, i.e. the return induced in asset i by a trade
of volume v in asset j must be equal to the impact of a trade of the same volume
v in asset i on the price of asset j.
It is natural to ask whether this symmetry condition is empirically verified. In
this paper we study a market whose microstructure, to the best of our knowledge,
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has not been explored so far. This is the MOT market for sovereign bonds2, a fully
electronic limit order book market for fixed income assets. One of the reasons for
our choice is that, due to the nature of the traded assets, we expect cross-impact,
especially due to quote revisions, to be very high. In fact, two Italian fixed-rate
BTPs differ mostly through the coupon rate and the time-to-maturity - factors
which are accounted for in the price, which moves in a very synchronised way since
for most purposes both titles are perfectly interchangeable.
Calibrating a multivariate TIM in trade time we find that there exist pairings
of bonds where the symmetry condition of cross-impact is violated in a statistically
significant way. By comparing the potential profit from a simple arbitrage strategy
to transaction costs such as the bid-ask spread, which are neglected in the model,
we conclude that arbitraging is not profitable. It is also crucial to point out that
the empirical part of the paper is important because it is the first application of
a TIM model to fixed income markets and to the best of our knowledge it is the
first work to consider cross-impact of single market orders and not the order sign
imbalance aggregated over fixed time intervals (as done in Busseti and Lillo [2012],
Benzaquen et al. [2017] and Wang et al. [2016a]).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and
the links to the no-dynamic-arbitrage principle. Section 3 discusses some general
constraints on cross-impact that arise in our framework for bounded decay kernels
and the corresponding proofs are given in Appendix A. In Section 4 we study cross-
impact empirically and compare to the theoretical results in Section 3. Finally
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Setup
The presence of dynamic arbitrage depends on the market impact model. In this
paper we consider the Transient Impact Model (TIM) introduced in Bouchaud et al.
[2004] (see Bouchaud et al. [2008] for a discussion). The model has been originally
formulated in discrete time, and its continuous time version, that we present in the
next section, has been proposed in Gatheral [2010].
2.1 Price Process and Cost of Trading
Gatheral [2010] assumes that the asset price St at time t follows a random walk
with a drift determined by the cumulative effect of previous trades
St = S0 +
∫ t
0
f(x˙s)G(t− s)ds+
∫ t
0
σdZs (1)
where f(x˙s) represents the (instantaneous) impact of trading at a rate x˙s at time
s < t weighted by a decay kernel G(τ) with τ = t − s. Zs is a noise process, for
example a Wiener process, and σ is the volatility. For consistency with equation (3)
below, the trading rate x˙ is given in units of number of shares per unit of time. In
our multivariate extension we consider the prices of a set of assets where the drift
2http://www.lseg.com/areas-expertise/our-markets/borsa-italiana/
fixed-income-markets/mot
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in asset i not only depends on the trading history of asset i but also on past trades
in assets j 6= i. Thus the price process of asset i is given by
Sit = S
i
0 +
∑
j
∫ t
0
f ij(x˙js)G
ij(t− s)ds+
∫ t
0
σidZis (2)
with a correlated noise process Zs (e.g. a multivariate Wiener process) and where
in addition to the self-impact terms f ii and Gii we have introduced additive cross-
impact terms f ij and Gij, i 6= j, that represent the impact of trading in asset j on
the price of asset i.
For a trading strategy Π = {xt} , t ∈ [0, T ] where xt is the vector of asset
positions xit in asset i at time t, the expected cost (or implementation shortfall) is
C(Π) = E
[∑
i
∫ T
0
x˙it(S
i
t − Si0)dt
]
=
∑
i,j
∫ T
0
x˙itdt
∫ t
0
f ij(x˙js)G
ij(t− s)ds (3)
where as in Gatheral [2010] we consider only costs due to price impact, i.e. the price
shift induced by our own trading, and neglect slippage costs, i.e. costs due to all
other market frictions such as bid-ask spreads and trading fees. Also Alfonsi et al.
[2016] ignore these costs by arguing that a sophisticated trading strategy consists
not only of market orders but also of limit orders, thus on average both paying
(earning) a half spread from market (limit) orders. In practice the constraints
we derive may well be weakened when slippage costs are unavoidable, e.g. when
immediacy requires to execute a trading strategy with market orders.
2.2 Principle of no-dynamic-arbitrage
Huberman and Stanzl [2004] define a round-trip trade as a sequence of trades whose
sum is zero, i.e. a trading strategy Π = {xt} with∫ T
0
x˙tdt = 0 . (4)
This implies a round-trip in all assets traded in the strategy, i.e.
∫ T
0
x˙itdt = 0 ∀ i.
A price manipulation is a round-trip trade Π whose expected cost C(Π) is negative
and the principle of no-dynamic-arbitrage states that such a price manipulation is
impossible. Formally, the principle requires that for any round trip trade Π it is
C(Π) ≥ 0 . (5)
In the one-dimensional case this translates to
C(Π) =
∫ T
0
x˙tdt
∫ t
0
f(x˙s)G(t− s)ds ≥ 0 (6)
and imposes a relationship on the market impact function f(·) and the decay kernel
G(·). The functions f(·) and G(·) are said to be consistent if they exclude the
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possibility of price manipulation. Several papers have studied the consistency of
this kind of market impact models (for a review see Gatheral and Schied [2013]).
Gatheral et al. [2011] show that any decay kernel that is non-singular at time zero
is inconsistent with non-linear f(·). Moreover Gatheral [2010] sets some necessary
constraints for no arbitrage for power law dependence of f and G and Curato et al.
[2017] show that inconsistencies can also arise for power-law f(·) and G(·) even
when necessary conditions derived in Gatheral [2010] are not violated.
In the multidimensional case the cost requirement is
C(Π) =
∑
i,j
∫ T
0
x˙itdt
∫ t
0
f ij(x˙js)G
ij(t− s)ds ≥ 0 (7)
and we are similarly looking at what forms of f(·) and G(·) are consistent when
there is cross-impact.3 Specifically we are asking what limits there are to cross-
impact, i.e. the form of f ij(·), i 6= j, and whether the presence of cross-impact
leads to possible arbitrages in pairs of f(·) and G(·) that are consistent in the
one-dimensional case.
3 General constraints on cross-impact for bounded
decay kernels
Let us for the remainder of this paper assume, without loss of generality, that G(τ)
is a dimensionless quantity, i.e. all dimensionality of cross-impact, including the
sign, is captured by the instantaneous market impact function f .
In this section we also assume that the decay kernel G(τ) is non-increasing,
right-continuous at τ = 0 and bounded in all components, i.e. that there exists
an upper bound U > 0 so that |Gij(τ)| < U for all τ ∈ [0,∞) and all i, j. While
we do not consider unbounded kernels in this section, we discuss in Appendix B
some constraints that arise for the popular class of pure power law kernels for
cross-impact. The non-increasing assumption rules out non-zero decay kernels with
Gij(0) = 0 so that we are able to take G as normalized to 1 for its smallest lag
τ = t − s, i.e. Gij(0) = 1 for all pairs ij.4 A special case of such a kernel is
exponential decay Gij(t− s) = e−ρij(t−s) as in Obizhaeva and Wang [2013].
In the following we consider the two-dimensional case, i ∈ {a, b}, i.e. the number
of assets N = 2. Note that all results from the one-dimensional case still hold
since we are free to choose a trading strategy that is active only in one asset, e.g.
Π =
(
Πa,Πb
)ᵀ
= (Πa, 0)ᵀ , ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] where Πa is a round-trip trading strategy in
asset a.
The proofs of the results in this section are given in Appendix A and are obtained
following the approach of Gatheral et al. [2011]. All results can also be obtained
following Gatheral [2010] under the slightly more restrictive assumptions of the
3Alfonsi et al. [2016] consider a slightly different case where instead of a round-trip strategy,
they consider the liquidation of an existing portfolio. This is equivalent in the limit of building
up the portfolio infinitely slowly and when impact is purely transient.
4The non-increasing assumption is necessary already in the single-asset case to avoid arbitrage
opportunities from simple buy-hold-sell strategies. In the multi-asset case we require it e.g. for
our symmetry result in Lemma 3.9.
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decay kernel G being representable as a suitable series expansion and considering
only the first non-zero orders in the limit of τ → 0+.
3.1 A simple strategy with two assets
In the following we will often make use of a simple strategy in two assets which is
split into two phases of trading at constant rates.
Example 3.1. A simple in-out strategy.
At first we build up a position at a constant trading rate from time 0 until time Θ,
with 0 < Θ < T , and then liquidate the position in a second phase from Θ until T .
Π = {xt} , x˙t =
{
(va,I, vb,I)
ᵀ for 0 ≤ t ≤ Θ
(va,II, vb,II)
ᵀ for Θ < t ≤ T . (8)
The velocities vi,I, vi,II are constrained by our choice of the strategy. Since Π
is a round-trip strategy, the trading rates vi,I and vi,II have opposite signs, i.e.
κ = vi,I/vi,II < 0, and the time Θ when the trading direction changes is given as
Θ =
−vi,II
vi,I−vi,IIT =
1
1−κT . Let us further fix notation with λ = va,I/vb,I = va,II/vb,II.
Figure 1a illustrates a possible realization of this strategy with λ < 0.
The cost of this strategy can be decomposed as C(Π) =
∑
i,j=a,bC
ij
A + C
ij
B + C
ij
C
where
CijA = vi,If
ij(vj,I)
∫ Θ
0
dt
∫ t
0
Gij(t− s)ds
CijB = vi,IIf
ij(vj,I)
∫ T
Θ
dt
∫ Θ
0
Gij(t− s)ds (9)
CijC = vi,IIf
ij(vj,II)
∫ T
Θ
dt
∫ t
Θ
Gij(t− s)ds
In the one-dimensional case the principle of no-dynamic-arbitrage imposes a
constraint on the term CiiB and from equation (7) it follows that −CiiB ≤ CiiA + CiiC
as in Gatheral [2010]. For the multi-dimensional case C(Π) ≥ 0 further implies a
relationship between the strength of cross-impact and self-impact.
In the following we will try to exploit cross-impact in order to push down the
cost of strategies. Supposing that cross-impact is positive for positive trading rates,
i.e. f ij(v) > 0 for v > 0, we can choose λ < 0, e.g. trading into asset a while
contemporaneously trading out of asset b, in order to get a negative contribution
from cross-impact.
3.2 Cross-impact as odd function of the trading rate
In the one-dimensional case Gatheral [2010] shows that permanent market impact
needs to be an odd function in the rate of trading v, i.e. f(v) = −f(−v). We show
here that the same holds for cross-impact for decay kernels that are non-singular
around τ → 0+.
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(a) Strategy as in Example 3.1
(b) Strategy as in Example 3.8
Figure 1: Schematic of the trading strategies in Example 3.1 (upper panel) and
Example 3.8 (lower panel).
Lemma 3.2. Assume a price process as in (2) with a bounded, non-increasing
decay kernel G that is continuous around τ = 0. Then such a model admits price
manipulation if f is not an odd function of the trading rate, i.e. unless
f ij(v) = −f ij(−v) ∀ i, j . (10)
Therefore we will assume for the remainder of this paper that (10) holds. As a
corollary it follows that
Corollary 3.3. Absence of dynamic-arbitrage for a price process as in (2) with a
decay kernel that is bounded, non-increasing and continuous around τ = 0 requires
that
f ij(v = 0) = 0 ∀ i, j . (11)
3.3 Constraints on the strength of cross-impact
The cost constraint in equation (7) also imposes a constraint on the relative strength
of f ij. Let us consider a simple example at first.
Example 3.4. Trading in and out at the same rate
We consider a strategy as above in Example (3.1) where we are trading in and
out of positions at the same rate, i.e. vi,I = −vi,II and therefore Θ = T/2, but in
different directions in the two assets, choosing e.g. va,I = va > 0, vb,I = −vb < 0
and thus λ < 0. For simplicity let us assume a uniform decay of market impact, i.e.
Gij(t) = G(t) for all pairings ij. The cost is then
C(Π) =
[
vaf
aa(va) + vbf
bb(vb)− vafab(vb)− vbf ba(va)
]
(12){∫ T/2
0
dt
∫ t
0
[G(t− s)−G(t+ T/2− s)] ds+
∫ T
T/2
dt
∫ t
T/2
[G(t− s)−G(T − s)] ds
}
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and Gatheral [2010] shows that the term in curly brackets in equation (12) is greater
than zero when further requiring that G(·) is strictly decreasing. Thus the no-
dynamic-arbitrage constraint (5) requires that
vaf
aa(va) + vbf
bb(vb)− vafab(vb)− vbf ba(va) ≥ 0 (13)
for any va, vb ≥ 0, thus constraining the relative size of the cross-impact terms fab
and f ba with respect to self-impact. Note that by setting vb = 0 we recover the
one-dimensional case and it follows that vaf
aa(va) ≥ 0.
In the general case, the decay Gij(τ) is not uniform and we can not factor out the
term in curly brackets in equation (12), instead we have to weight each of the terms
of equation (13) with a factor that depends on the decay Gij(τ). Furthermore we
are free to choose a strategy with different trading rates as in Example 3.1 or a more
sophisticated strategy. Alfonsi et al. [2016] consider this problem in discrete time
with linear instantaneous price impact. Their Proposition 2.6 states that absence
of arbitrage in the sense of equation (7) is equivalent to the condition that the
elementwise product of strength of impact and the decay kernel corresponds to a
positive definite matrix-valued function.
3.4 Linearity of market impact
Gatheral et al. [2011] finds that any single-asset market impact model as in equation
(1) is inconsistent when f is non-linear and G is bounded and non-increasing. We
expand this proposition to the multi-asset case with cross-impact, i.e.
Lemma 3.5. Assuming a price process as in (2) with a bounded, non-increasing
decay kernel G that is continuous around τ = 0 and a non-linear market impact
function f . Then such a model admits price manipulation.
As a corollary of Lemma 3.5 we can extend Lemma 4.1 in Gatheral [2010] for
self-impact to the case with cross-impact.
Corollary 3.6. A price process as in (2) with self- and cross-impact that decays
exponentially at different rates and instantaneous price impact that is non-linear,
admits price manipulations.
We obtain the same corollary for purely permanent impact by taking the limit
ρij → 0+ in the case of exponential decay Gij(t−s) = e−ρij(t−s), as already observed
in Huberman and Stanzl [2004]:
Corollary 3.7. Nonlinear permanent self- and cross-asset market impact is incon-
sistent with the principle of no-dynamic-arbitrage.
3.5 Symmetry of cross-impact
Again we assume that G(τ) is bounded, non-increasing and continuous around
τ = 0 and therefore that impact is linear, i.e. f ij(v) = ηijv, for otherwise our
model is inconsistent, as shown in the previous section. We will further show that
in this case impact needs to be symmetric, i.e. ηij = ηji, in order to avoid price
manipulations.
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Example 3.8. An asymmetric strategy with purely permanent and linear impact.
Suppose market impact is linear and permanent, i.e. f ij(v) = ηijv and Gij(τ) =
1 ∀ i, j. Then the cost of trading in the single-asset case only depends on the initial
and final positions x0 and xT . If there is cross-impact between two or more assets,
there is also an interaction term between the trading rates in different assets, i.e.
C(Π) =
∑
i,j
∫ T
0
vitdt
∫ t
0
ηijvjsds
=
∑
i
ηii
2
(xiT − xi0)2 +
∑
j 6=i
ηij
∫ T
0
vitdt
∫ t
0
vjsds (14)
and while the first sum with the self-impact terms disappears for a round-trip
strategy since x0 = xT , this is not generally the case for the second sum with
the terms due to cross-impact. To see this, let us consider a different round-trip
strategy Π in two assets, which is now asymmetric and lasts over three phases:
vat =

va for 0 ≤ t ≤ T/3
0 for T/3 < t ≤ 2T/3
−va for 2T/3 < t ≤ T
, vbt =

−vb for 0 ≤ t ≤ T/3
vb for T/3 < t ≤ 2T/3
0 for 2T/3 < t ≤ T
,
(15)
as illustrated in Figure 1b. While self-impact cancels out when we calculate C(Π),
the asymmetry in our strategy makes for a non-trivial total cost that stems from
cross-impact:
C(Π) = vavb
T 2
18
(ηba − ηab). (16)
If ηba < ηab this gives a negative cost and likewise when ηba > ηab by interchanging
assets a↔ b in the strategy (15). Therefore it follows that cross-impact needs to be
symmetric with respect to asset pairs in order to exclude arbitrage opportunities,
as observed in Huberman and Stanzl [2004].
In fact we can expand this result to the transient impact case:
Lemma 3.9. If decay of market impact G(τ) is bounded, non-increasing and con-
tinuous around τ = 0 and f ij(v) = ηijv is linear, absence of dynamic arbitrage
requires that
ηij = ηji ∀ i, j . (17)
Let us reconsider Example 3.4 taking into account linearity and symmetry of
cross-impact as shown above. In this case Equation (13) simplifies to
v2aη
aa + v2bη
bb − 2vavbηcross ≥ 0 (18)
and minimizing the cost constrains the strength of cross-impact ηcross = ηab = ηba
as
ηcross ≤
√
ηaaηbb , (19)
in agreement with Proposition 3.7.(b) of Alfonsi et al. [2016] and equivalent to the
condition for a symmetric 2× 2 matrix to be positive-semidefinite.
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3.6 Exponential decay
The conditions of linearity and symmetry of cross-impact are necessary for absence
of arbitrage, but are they also sufficient?
Example 3.10. An asymmetric strategy with symmetric, exponentially decaying
linear impact.
Let us re-consider the strategy in Eq. (15) with exponentially decaying impact
Gij(t− s) = e−ρij(t−s) and a linear instantaneous impact function f ij(v) = ηijv that
is now symmetric with ηab = ηba = ηcross. The cost terms for self-impact are now
Caa =
ηaav2a
(ρaa)2
[
−e−ρaaT + 2e−2ρaaT/3 + e−ρaaT/3 − 2 + 2ρ
aaT
3
]
Cbb =
ηbbv2b
(ρbb)2
[
−e−2ρbbT/3 + 4e−ρbbT/3 − 3 + 2ρ
bbT
3
]
. (20)
and likewise for cross-impact
Cab =
ηcrossvavb
(ρab)2
[
−ρ
abT
3
+ 2e−ρ
abT/3 − 3e−2ρabT/3 + e−ρabT
]
Cba =
ηcrossvavb
(ρba)2
[
2− ρ
baT
3
− 3e−ρbaT/3 + e−2ρbaT/3
]
. (21)
When we develop the terms in squared brackets in (20) and (21) in powers of ρijT
all terms of order (ρijT )0 and (ρijT )1 cancel out, while terms proportional to (ρijT )2
sum to 0 thanks to the symmetry of instantaneous cross-impact. The cost to the
first non-zero order of ρijT is then
C(Π) =
T 3
6
[
2
3
ηaav2aρ
aa +
4
27
ηbbv2bρ
bb − 5
27
ηcrossvavb
(
ρab + ρba
)]
+
∑
i,j
O ((ρij)2T 4)
(22)
and when ρab or ρba is large enough5 compared to the other terms the cost can still
be negative. For absence of price manipulations we therefore also require further
constraints on the speed of decay described by G.
This is in agreement with the results of Alfonsi et al. [2016] in discrete time.
Their Proposition 3.7 proves that the conditions of symmetry ηab = ηba, and a non-
increasing decay kernel, i.e. min(ρab, ρba) ≥ 1
2
(ρaa + ρbb) and 1
4
(ηabρab + ηbaρba)2 ≤
ηaaρaaηbbρbb, are sufficient for the absence of arbitrage. We complement this result
in Lemma 3.9 by showing that symmetry ηij = ηji is indeed necessary for any
decay kernel G(τ) that fulfills our conditions of being bounded, non-increasing
and continuous around τ = 0. Note that this excludes kernels where for some ij
Gij(0) = 0 but Gij(τ) > 0 for some τ > 0. Indeed Example 3 in Alfonsi et al.
[2016] has a kernel that is asymmetric for τ > 0 and which does not allow price
manipulation.
5While keeping the product of ρijT small for all ij.
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4 Empirical evidence of cross-impact
4.1 Market Structure of MOT
For the empirical analysis we consider Italian sovereign bonds traded on the retail
platform “Mercato telematico delle obbligazioni e dei titoli di Stato” (MOT). We
choose to estimate cross-impact between bonds instead of equities since we expect
the strength of cross-impact among sovereign bonds of the same issuing country,
especially of similar maturity, to be bigger than the one between e.g. stocks or
indices. Sovereign bonds of one country typically have a very similar underlying
risk and their prices are implicitly connected via the yield curve, a link that we
deem stronger than e.g. a common factor between stocks of the same sector.
The secondary market for European sovereign bonds is divided into an opaque
over-the-counter market (OTC) and an observable exchange-traded market. The
Italian securities and exchange Commission CONSOB publishes a bi-annual re-
port listing the share in trading of Italian government bonds separated per trading
venue6. For the year 2014 (2015) the share of OTC trading has been 58.8% (59.1%),
while 45.6% (44.8%) of trading on platforms took place on the inter-dealer platform
MTS. MOT is the third-largest platform by traded value with 8.7% (8.8%) of traded
value excluding the OTC market in 2014 (2015). Most of the literature for the Ital-
ian and European government bonds market focuses on MTS, with the exception
of Linciano et al. [2014] who compare the liquidity of dual-listed corporate bonds
across MOT and the EuroTLX platform. Darbha and Dufour [2013] review the
market microstructure of MTS in the context of the market for European sovereign
bonds and discuss several liquidity measures based on the limit order book, trades
or bond characteristics. They note that MTS “normally has a few trades per bond
per day, even for the most liquid government bonds”. Indeed, due to large minimum
sizes, for most titles there is on average less than one transaction per day on MTS,
making studies of market impact difficult. Dufour and Nguyen [2012] overcome this
issue by building impulse response functions from regressions of returns on order
flow at 10 second intervals to study permanent market impact. In a different ap-
proach Schneider et al. [2016] use a measure of (virtual) mechanical price impact
along with other liquidity measures calculated from the limit order book to detect
illiquidity shocks that can be modeled as a self- and cross-exciting Hawkes process
in and across Italian sovereign bonds.
Instead in this paper we focus on MOT where we observe a sufficient number of
(smaller) trades as well as an active limit order book. Italian government bonds are
traded on the DomesticMOT segment of MOT where the trading day is divided into
an opening auction from 8:00 to 9:00 followed7 by a phase of continuous trading until
17:30. If certain price limits are violated during the continuous trading, a volatility
auction phase is initiated for a duration of 10-11 minutes. MOT is organized as
a continuous double auction where besides market and limit orders also partially
hidden “iceberg orders”, “committed cross” orders and “block trade facilities” are
allowed. While the presence of a specialist or a bid specialist is possible, in practice
6CONSOB, Bollettino Statistico Nr. 8, March 2016, available at http://www.consob.it/web/
area-pubblica/bollettino-statistico
7The conclusion of contracts from the opening auction happens at a random time between
09:00:00-09:00:59.
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this is only the case for a subset of financial sector corporate bonds not in our sample.
The tick size depends on the residual lifetime and is 1 basis point of nominal size or
0.1 basis points if the residual lifetime is less or equal than two years, corresponding
to 1 or 0.1 euro cents respectively.
Our dataset contains all trades and limit order book (LOB) snapshots8 for a
selection of 60 ISINs from December 1, 2014 to February 27, 2015 and April 13,
2015 to October 16, 2015 for a total of 194 trading days. For the remainder of
this paper we will focus on a set of N = 33 fixed rate or zero-coupon Italian
sovereign bonds listed in Appendix C with at least 5,000 trades throughout our
sample to ensure sufficient liquidity and statistical significance of our results. To
avoid intraday seasonalities we further restrict our data to 10:00 - 17:00 and discard
observations when we detect a volatility auction. The average spread is smaller than
10 ticks for most of the bonds with the exception of some very long-term bonds and
bonds where the tick size is 0.1 basis points. More than 92% of the orders in our
sample are executed at the corresponding best bid or ask quote9 and thus identified
as sell or buy orders respectively, while all other orders are classified according to
the algorithm of Lee and Ready [1991].
Let us fix notation for the estimations in the following sections. We consider
the log-price X it = log(S
i
t) of the mid-price of the best bid and ask quote for
asset i at time t and calculate the return rit,t+∆t from time t to time t + ∆t as
rit,t+∆t = X
i
t+∆t−ε−X it−ε for ε→ 0+. it is the sign of a trade (market order) and +1
for a buyer-initiated transaction, −1 for a sell, and undefined when there is no trade
in the asset i at time t. I it is an indicator function that is +1 when there is a trade
in asset i at time t and 0 otherwise and we consider the product of an undefined
trade sign with a 0 indicator function to be 0 such that the product itI
i
t is always
defined and one of {−1, 0,+1}. The size of a trade V it is given as its nominal value
in EUR and the price is reported per one asset (or contract) with a face value of 100
EUR. Unlike e.g. Benzaquen et al. [2017] we do not de-mean the order sign in order
to avoid attributing a price impact to the absence of transactions in a bond in the
sense of Corollary 3.3. However we have verified that our results are qualitatively
similar when considering de-meaned order signs  or I and de-meaned returns.
4.2 Response function
We define the self- and cross-response function Rij∆t as the unconditional ∆t-ahead
return in asset i controlled for the order sign of asset j, i.e.
Rij∆t = E
[(
X it+∆t−ε −X it−ε
)
jtI
j
t
]
. (23)
For i = j we will speak of self-response and of cross-response for i 6= j. Figure
2 shows the average self- and cross-response function for all bonds in our sample
and their pairings respectively. For positive lags ∆t we find that self-response is on
8In phases of heavy trading multiple updates of the LOB may be recorded as one update in
our data. However there is at least one update per second whenever there are changes to the LOB
and in the vast majority of our sample updates are more frequent.
9The remaining ∼ 8% can either be due to orders that were executed across more than one
millisecond (so that they are recorded as two or more orders), missed LOB updates or exotic order
types.
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Figure 2: Plot of average self- and cross- response function Rij∆t in transaction time
as defined in Section 4.4. Mean over all bonds and pairings in our sample and
weighted by the number of trades in the triggering bond j. Self-response is shown
as red dots connected by solid lines, cross-response as blue triangles connected by
dashed lines. The lines correspond to the prediction from the model in Section 4.4.
average larger than cross-response by a factor of ∼ 5, consistent with observations of
Benzaquen et al. [2017], Wang et al. [2016a,b]. Rij∆t=0 is zero by definition, whereas
for small negative ∆t we find that Rij is on average positive, producing a cusp at
∆t = 0. We conjecture that such behavior is not observed in Benzaquen et al. [2017]
because of the rather large time lag of 5 minutes, corresponding to ∼ 80 units of
transaction time in Figure 2. In the single asset case this feature is clearly present for
the large-tick stock Microsoft in Figure 1 of Taranto et al. [2016]. As shown there,
the kink could be related to correlations of market order flow with past returns and
indicates a forecasting power of current returns on the future order sign imbalance.
Interestingly we find that the cross-response measured at negative lags is smaller
(i.e. larger in absolute value) than self-response, contrary to the observations in
Benzaquen et al. [2017].10 The figure also shows the prediction from the model of
the negative lag impact (see Taranto et al. [2016] for details). We observe a clear
difference with the empirical data suggesting also for cross-impact a reaction of
order flow to past price dynamics of other bonds.
10We suppose that this is related to the fact that many of the bonds considered here are easily
substitutable for one another.
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4.3 Instantaneous market impact
We measure the instantaneous market impact function f(·) as
f ij(V ) = E
[
rit−ε,t+2s
j
t |Ijt,V = 1
]
(24)
which is the expected return in asset i from just before a trade at time t until 2
seconds after t, multiplied by the trade sign in asset j at time t and conditional on
a trade in asset j at time t of size V . We have chosen the two second interval as
twice the maximum time between two updates of the limit order book, i.e. we can
rule out that changes in the book were not reported in our data. For measurement
purposes we bin similar trade sizes together, with the bin size chosen as a function
of the number of trades in the triggering bond j.
Figure 3 shows self- and cross-impact between all bonds in our sample as a
function of trade size V measured in units of face value. Cross-impact is universally
present across our sample and on average smaller than self-impact by roughly one
order of magnitude. The cross-impact curves of different pairings ij are very close
one to the other when both bonds have a time-to-maturity of at least four years
left. For bonds with three or less years left until maturity we do not observe an
intense trading activity, thus the curves in the leftmost column in the figure are
very noisy. Likely the price-dynamics of these short-term titles are more decoupled
from the medium- and long-term bonds with a lifespan of four or more years. The
figure shows that all the estimated functions f ij(V ) are non-linear, being concave
and well described by a power law behavior with an exponent smaller than 1. This
has been already observed in self-impact (Lillo et al. [2003]) and is extended here
to cross-impact.11
Having established the evidence for cross-impact, we investigate its possible
origin: Is this due to correlated trades across assets (e.g. a strategy trading several
bonds simultaneously) or is it mostly due to quote revision following a trade, leading
to changes of the mid-price of a bond in the absence of trades? To discriminate
between these alternatives, we repeat the analysis in Figure 3 and distinguish now
whether there were any trades beyond the triggering one in any other bond in our
sample during a period from 3 seconds before to 2 seconds after the triggering
transaction, which we will call isolated trades. For better readability in Figure 4
we focus on the four most recently issued 30 year BTPs in our sample, which were
shown in the lower right panel of Figure 3. Results are similar for all other pairs
of bonds. When we consider market impact of isolated trades only, self impact
is lower than unconditionally. This is somewhat expected since order signs are
positively autocorrelated and we exclude contributions where other trades have on
average a positive contribution to impact. However the decrease in market impact is
stronger for the cross-impact components, which are smaller by a factor of ∼ 5−10
on average, whereas self-impact decreases only by a factor ∼ 2 on average. We
conclude therefore that both an autocorrelation of orders across assets as well as
11In principle this observation suggests the presence of arbitrage opportunities due to the viola-
tion of Lemma 3.5. However we should remember that what is shown in Figure 3 is the observed
impact, which might be different from the virtual impact, since the former does not take into
account the selection bias due to the fact that traders condition the market order volume to what
is present at the opposite best. For a discussion of this point in the self-impact case, see Bouchaud
et al. [2008].
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Figure 3: Plot of the average self- and cross-impact function among all pairs of bonds
in our sample as a function of trade size V measured in units of face value. Each
line corresponds to one pairing ij, grouped by time-to-maturity into four categories,
where impact is from the column on the row. Self-impact is shown in the diagonal
panels as red solid lines, cross-impact is shown as blue dashed lines and present in
all panels. Price impact is calculated as average price change (multiplied by the
trade sign) after a lag of 2 seconds, the minimum time that ensures we observe an
update of the limit order book. Self- and cross-impact is clearly non-linear. For
comparison the solid black line in the lower left panel illustrates a linear impact
function.
quote revisions play a role in forming cross-impact. In the next section we will take
into account the (cross-) autocorrelation of the order sign when we estimate the
shape of the decay of market impact.
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Figure 4: Plot of the average self- and cross-impact function among the four most
recent 30 year bonds in our sample. Each line corresponds to one pairing ij, where
impact is from the column on the row. Self-impact is present on the diagonal panels
in red, cross-impact on the off-diagonals in blue. Solid lines show the market impact
function based on all trades as in Figure 3, dotted lines show market impact based
on isolated trades only, i.e. when there was no other transaction from 3 seconds
before to 2 seconds after the triggering trade.
4.4 Decay kernel
To estimate the empirically observed decay function we employ a multivariate ver-
sion of the transient impact model of Bouchaud et al. [2004] and similarly to Ben-
zaquen et al. [2017], Wang and Guhr [2016]. While the advantage of the model
lies in the fully non-parametric estimation of the kernel that we obtain, the TIM
is typically estimated in event time which is asset-specific. Previous approaches
avoid potential pitfalls by estimating the propagator in calendar time and binning
trades. The estimation then is sensitive to the bin width. A small bin-width such
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as 1 second in Wang and Guhr [2016] introduces problems in the treatment of bins
without trading activity, while a large bin width such as 5 minutes in Benzaquen
et al. [2017] is too coarse to observe effects of single transactions. The main dif-
ference of our estimation is that we estimate the propagator in a combined market
order time. Specifically our combined trade time is defined to advance by one unit
for any unique timestamp at which there is at least one trade recorded, irrespective
of the asset(s).12
Our model for the (log-) mid-price X it of asset i just before a trade at time t
reads
X it =
∑
t′<t
{∑
j
[
H ij(t− t′)jt′Ijt′
]
+ ξit′
}
+X i−∞ (25)
where it is the order sign and I
i
t an indicator function for a trade in asset i at
time t as defined in Section 4.1. ξ is a noise term with correlation matrix Σ(ξ) and
the empirically observed correlation structure of returns r of X is not Σ(ξ) but
the noise component Σ(ξ) plus the component due to the correlated order flow and
cross-impact Σ(H), as shown in Benzaquen et al. [2017]. Finally self- and cross-
impact is captured by the propagator matrix H ij(δt) which gives the price impact
of a trade in asset j on asset i after a positive time lag δt. Note that here we assume
that trades of all volumes have the same impact and to avoid confusion with the
previous sections we denote the decay kernel H .13 In this model returns rit in asset
i from a trade at time t to the next time-step are then defined as
rit = X
i
t+1 −X it
=
∑
j
H ij(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hij(0)
jtI
j
t +
∑
j
∑
t′<t
H ij(t+ 1− t′)−H ij(t− t′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hij(t−t′)
ij
(t− t′)jt′Ijt′ + ξit
=
∑
j
∑
t′≤t
Hij(t− t′)jt′Ijt′ + ξit (26)
where H(`) ≡ H(` + 1) −H(`), H(` ≤ 0) ≡ 0 and due to the definition of the
price process in equation (25) a lag of τ = 0 as the argument of G in equation (2)
corresponds to ` = 1 for H . In practice (both due to computational limitations
and to avoid dealing with overnight effects) the sum over t′ is performed up to a
cutoff lag p. For an estimation of H that is more stable with respect to p (Eisler
et al. [2012]) we compute the observable S˜ ij(`)
S˜ ij(`) = E[rit+`jtIjt ] (27)
=
∑
k
∑
n≥0
Hik(n)E [kt+`−nIkt+l−njtIjt ]
=
∑
k
∑
n≥0
Hik(n)C˜kj(`− n) (28)
12In other words, each trade advances time by one step, unless when there are two or more
trades (in the same or different assets) recorded at exactly the same timestamp (at millisecond
resolution). In such a case our combined trade time advances only by 1. In our sample ca. 3% of
trades happen at the same time-stamp as another trade in a different bond.
13H corresponds to the elementwise product of f and G as defined in equation (2), given the
assumption of indifference to trade size.
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where C˜(` − n) is the cross-correlation matrix of the modified order sign itI it at
lag `− n.14 To estimate H ij(n) = ∑n−1l=0 Hij we re-write equation (28) as a matrix
equation
S˜ =HC˜ (29)
where with a slight abuse of notation S˜ and H are row vectors of N × N block
matrices, i.e. S˜ = (S˜(0), · · · , S˜(p − 1)) and H = (H(0), · · · ,H(p − 1)), and C˜
is a symmetric block-Toeplitz matrix of p× p blocks of the correlation matrices at
different lags, of dimension Np×Np,
C˜ =

C˜(0) C˜(1) · · · C˜(p− 1)
(C˜(1))ᵀ C˜(0) · · · C˜(p− 2)
...
...
. . .
...
(C˜(p− 1))ᵀ (C˜(p− 2))ᵀ · · · C˜(0)
 (30)
where we use that C˜(−m)) = (C˜(m))ᵀ. To estimate H and thus H we invert C˜
and right-multiply equation (29) with C˜−1, where both S˜ and C˜ are constructed
from (weighted) averages over daily estimations.
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Figure 5: Plot of the estimated average decay kernel H ij (in basis points) for self-
impact (red dots connected by solid lines) and cross-impact (blue triangles con-
nected by dashed lines) among all bonds in our sample. For self- (cross-) impact we
show the mean over all bonds (pairings) weighted by the number of transactions in
the triggering bond.
14Note that even though we refer to it as such, C˜ is not strictly speaking a correlation matrix,
as we do not de-mean nor normalize itI
i
t .
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Figure 5 shows the mean of the decay kernel H ij(τ) for self- and cross-impact
averaged over all the bonds and pairings and weighted by the number of transac-
tions. The mean and median values are not shown here but behave similarly. Both
propagators do not decay immediately but reach their peak after ∼ 10 transactions.
This indicates a market inefficiency which has been observed for self-impact in other
markets (see e.g. Figure 1 in Taranto et al. [2016]). In the absence of slippage this
inefficiency could be exploited by e.g. a simple buy-hold-sell strategy. However here
the expected gain is on the order of ∼ 0.1 basis points while spread costs are > 1
basis points so that such a strategy would not be profitable. Further we observe
that self- and cross-impact decay rather slowly with average self-impact reaching
its initial level after ∼ 100 transactions, corresponding to ∼ 10 minutes of physical
time and cross-impact taking even longer.
4.5 Testing for symmetry of cross-impact
We have shown in section 3.5 that for a bounded decay kernel the strength of cross-
impact must be symmetric across pairs, i.e. ηij = ηji. Here we check whether
this is empirically verified. In the estimation of the previous section where we
are averaging over the trade volume, effectively regressing returns on trade events,
this corresponds to the condition that Hˆ ij(1) = Hˆji(1), i.e. we are assuming that
prices are roughly constant so that absolute returns can be approximated by relative
returns and that the average value (trade volume weighted by price) does not differ
across bonds. As a robustness check, we repeat the estimation taking into account
trading value, i.e. we modify Equation (26) to be
rit =
∑
k
∑
t′≤t
K˜ik(t− t′)kt′W kt′Ikt′ (31)
where we are now regressing returns on traded value W it = S
i
tV
i
t and the estimated
impact and the decay kernel K(n) =
∑n−1
l=0 K˜(l) is connected to the η and G
discussed in Sections 2 and 3 via
K˜ij(t− s) = η˜ijGij(t− s) = η
ij
SitS
j
t
Gij(t− s) (32)
when assuming a linear f . Clearly the symmetry of ηij of Lemma 3.9 must hold also
for η˜ij = K˜ij(1) which is the impact and decay kernel estimated at its smallest lag.
Again we assume a roughly constant bond price process S. The added accuracy
of this estimation due to including the value is countered by the fact that the
empirically observed market impact function is non-linear.
While we may easily check for symmetry on the estimated impact matrix η, this
does not allow for any statement on its statistical significance. Therefore we repeat
the estimation on a shorter time scale, i.e. we obtain S˜ and C˜ by averaging over the
days of each calendar week instead of over the whole sample period and estimate
the decay kernel Hw (or Kw respectively for the estimation on trade value) for each
week w separately. For each of the 41 estimated Hw we compute the asymmetry
∆H ijw = H
ij
w (1) − Hjiw (1) and for each of the 33 × 32/2 = 528 pairs we perform a
Student’s t-test of the null hypothesis that ∆H ijw = 0. For robustness we repeat
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Percentage of significantly asymmetric pairs confidence level
regression on aggregation 1% 5% 10%
trade events
weekly 8.0% 16.3% 24.4%
bi-weekly 6.1% 15.3% 24.6%
monthly 4.0% 14.0% 24.1%
trade value
weekly 3.0% 12.1% 21.8%
bi-weekly 3.4% 11.6% 21.0%
monthly 2.5% 11.0% 21.8%
Table 1: Percentage of bond-pairs for which the null of symmetry in cross-
impact is rejected according to a t-test on the null ∆H ijw = H
ij
w (1) − Hjiw (1) = 0
(∆Kijw = K
ij
w (1)−Kjiw (1) = 0). Tests are performed on weekly/bi-weekly/monthly
estimations of H (K) from regressions of returns on signed trades (value of trades).
this for three different aggregation periods: weekly as described above, bi-weekly,
and monthly.
In Table 1 we report the number of pairs for which the null hypothesis that
∆H ij = 0 (∆Kij = 0) is rejected. The table reveals that for all scenarios and for all
confidence levels the number of bond pairs for which the assumption of symmetric
cross-impact is not supported is larger than the number expected under the null
hypothesis.15 This implies that in principle it is possible to exploit this dynamic
arbitrage opportunity in at least some pairs, for example by using the strategy
presented in Section 3.5.
We now check whether such a strategy would also be easily profitable in the
bond pairs singled out above when taking into account bid-ask spread costs. We
proxy the slippage by the bid-ask spread Bi of bond i and thus for the strategy in
equation (15) we obtain
Cslippage ' (vaBa + vbBb)T
3
(33)
Ccross ' vavbT
2
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∆η (34)
where ∆η = |ηab − ηba|. In order to make a profit the ratio
Ccross
Cslippage
' v
avbT∆η
6(vaBa + vbBb)
, (35)
which is scaling as vT , must be larger than one. To evaluate this ratio we need
to make further assumptions on the the trading rate v and the execution duration
T . For the duration T , we need to keep in mind that in the proof of Lemma 3.9
we operated in the limit of very fast trading, i.e. under the assumption that the
kernel is approximately constant. The most conservative estimate for T then would
be 3 units of trade time, as this is the fastest we can execute the three phases of
15We have been unable to make out any obvious patterns which pairs are significantly asym-
metric when ordering by various measures of liquidity and trading activity (time-to-maturity,
maturity, bid-ask spread, average number of trades per day, average trade volume, turnover, tick
size). This suggests that the asymmetry we observe is not just a mere artifact of any of those
measures.
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the strategy. On the other extreme, the empirically observed decay of impact in
Figure 5 suggests that the kernel actually first increases for ∼ 10 trade time units
and then decays slowly, reaching its initial value only after ∼ 100 (∼ 500) trade
time units for self-impact (cross-impact). Thus the maximal value of T which is
consistent with the constant kernel is of the order of ∼ 100 trade time units. If we
assume too high of a value for the trading rate v, the assumption of linear slippage
costs no longer holds, as liquidity in the limit order book would be consumed faster
than being replenished and additional price impact costs would arise. We therefore
suppose that an arbitrageur would use an average-sized trading rate and assume
viT as three times the average trade value in asset i as reported in Table 2.16
In the following we estimate the ratio in equation (35) for the set of 6 pairs (1.1%)
where symmetry is rejected at the 5% level for at least five of the six aggregation
and regression scenarios of Table 1.17 Conservatively assuming T as 3 units of trade
time and with the assumptions described above, we get C
cross
Cslippage
∼ 1 ·10−4. If we are
able to maintain this strategy for a longer period T (at the same trading rate), we
are getting closer to profitability since gains from cross-impact scale as T 2 and losses
due to slippage as T . Assuming T = 100, i.e. the timescale when on average impact
has decayed beyond its initial timescale, yields a ratio C
cross
Cslippage
∼ 0.005. Only if we
were able to neglect decay and other costs when executing our strategy throughout
a whole trading day, it could turn profitable. Given that we do observe a faster
decay (but also considering the associated risk and the chance that dominating the
trading activity with the strategy might produce a less favorable impact structure)
we conclude that dynamic arbitrage from cross-impact is unprofitable at least with
our simple trading strategy. However our results also indicate that it is worth taking
cross-impact into account when executing other strategies.
5 Conclusion
Even though cross-impact has been studied in the theoretical literature on optimal
portfolio liquidation, empirical studies have been scarce until very recently. In this
paper we aim to connect the two strands of literature from a no-dynamic-arbitrage
perspective.
A desirable market impact model should be free of arbitrage opportunities. In
this paper we focus on the specific class of multi-asset Transient Impact Models
(TIMs) of market impact and we derive some necessary conditions for the absence
of dynamic arbitrage. In particular, by using specific examples of simple round-trip
strategies, we focus our attention on possible constraints on the shape and size of
cross-impact.
One such condition is symmetry of cross-impact with respect to its direction
between assets and we test it on empirical cross-impact kernels obtained by esti-
mating a TIM in transaction time on Italian sovereign bonds traded in the MOT
electronic market. Due to the strongly interrelated nature of these assets, we believe
cross-impact plays a much stronger role here than compared to other asset classes
16To see this, denote the average trade size in asset i as x¯i shares and take the case of executing
the strategy in three trades corresponding to 3 units of trade time. The first phase, i.e. the first
trade, lasts T/3 and is of size x¯i shares, therefore viT = 3x¯i shares.
17Considering different sets leads to similar results.
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such as, for example, equities. We find that while there exist statistically significant
violations of the no-arbitrage conditions related to impact symmetry, these are un-
profitable because of slippage costs such as the bid-ask spread which are neglected
in the theoretical considerations.
In addition to this, we want to stress our contributions in describing the high-
frequency market microstructure of the MOT sovereign bond market, applying the
TIM to fixed-income markets and presenting evidence for cross-impact at the level
of single orders instead of aggregated order flows. While this type of modeling and
empirical estimation has been performed on many different types of markets, the
application to sovereign bond (electronic) markets is new. This makes our paper
also relevant from a monetary policy point of view. Recent studies (Schlepper
et al. [2017], Arrata and Nguyen [2017], De Santis and Holm-Hadulla [2017]) that
aim to quantify the price impact (measured as decline in the yield to maturity)
of Quantitative Easing purchases in the Euro area could benefit from taking into
account cross-impact effects.
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A Proofs
Let us recall that for all proofs in this section we assume that the decay kernel G
is bounded, i.e. there exists an upper bound U > 0 so that |Gij(τ)| < U for all
τ ∈ [0,∞) and all i, j and therefore we take G as normalized to 1 for its smallest
lag τ = t − s, i.e. Gij(0) = 1 for all pairs ij. Further we assume G(τ) to be
non-increasing and right-continuous at τ = 0, i.e.
∀ε > 0∃Tε > 0 such that∀ τ with0 < τ < Tε and∀ i, j : |Gij(0)−Gij(τ)| < ε. (36)
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We first show that a non-odd f leads to a price manipulation
in the single-asset case. Let us therefore assume an in-out strategy Π as in the first
component of Example 3.1 with κ = −1 and therefore ϑ = 1/2, i.e. both phases of
trading last equally long. That is we first accumulate a position at the rate v > 0
to then liquidate it at the same negative rate −v. Without loss of generality we
choose v such that f(v) > −f(−v) ≥ 0 and that
ε :=
1
4
f(v) + f(−v)
f(v)
> 0 (37)
which is non-zero since f is not an odd function.18 Then by continuity there exists
a Tε > 0 for which we can bound the cost of our strategy as
C(Π) = vf(v)
∫ T/2
0
dt
∫ t
0
G(t− s)ds
− vf(−v)
∫ T
T/2
dt
∫ t
T/2
G(t− s)ds
− vf(v)
∫ T
T/2
dt
∫ T/2
0
G(t− s)ds
≤ vf(v)T
2
8
− vf(−v)T
2
8
− vf(v)(1− ε)T
2
4
= v
T 2
8
[−f(v)− f(−v) + 2εf(v)]
< 0 (38)
when choosing T = Tε. That is for any trading rate v there is a Tε > 0 for which
there is a price manipulation by our choice of ε. Therefore we conclude that f(v)
must be an odd function of v in the single-asset case and the same holds for self-
impact f ii in the multi-asset case with cross-impact since we can always execute a
strategy in only one asset.
Let us now show that the same holds for cross-impact. We choose va, vb > 0 and
for simplicity we assume that sgn(x˙if
ij(x˙j) = sgn(x˙ix˙j) for all i, j, the proof being
analogous in the other cases. We re-define
ε :=
va
[
fab(vb) + f
ab(−vb)
]
4vafaa(va) + 4vbf bb(vb) + 3vafab(vb)− vafab(−vb) + 3vbf ba(va)− vbf ba(−va) > 0
(39)
18In the case that f(v) < −f(−v) all we need is to change the sign in equation (37) to ensure
that ε is positive. In the cases that either f(v) ≤ 0∧ f(−v) ≤ 0 or f(v) ≥ 0∧ f(−v) ≥ 0 the price
manipulation arises in a simple in-out or out-in strategy as above respectively. Finally if assuming
vf(v) ≤ 0 the proof is analogous to the one above.
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where again we assume for simplicity that fab(vb) + f
ab(−vb) > 0, the proof being
analogous in the other case with fab(vb) and f
ab(−vb) interchanged in (39). We
assume a first strategy Π1 as in Example 3.1, again with κ = −1 and therefore
ϑ = 1/2, and λ > 0, that is we first accumulate both assets at the rates va, vb > 0
to then liquidate both positions at the negative rates −va,−vb < 0:
Π1 = {x˙t} , x˙t =
{
(+va,+vb)
ᵀ for 0 ≤ t ≤ T/2
(−va,−vb)ᵀ for T/2 < t ≤ T
(40)
Choosing T = Tε we are able to bound the cost of this strategy as above, obtaining
C(Π1) ≤ T
2
8
∑
i,j=a,b
vif
ij(vj)− vif ij(−vj)− 2vi(1− ε)f ij(vj)
=
T 2
8
{
−va
[
fab(vb) + f
ab(−vb)
]− vb [f ba(va) + f ba(−va)]+ 2ε ∑
i,j=a,b
vif
ij(vj)
}
.
(41)
Repeating the same estimation for a strategy Π2 which is anti-symmetric with λ < 0
but otherwise as above, i.e.
Π2 = {x˙t} , x˙t =
{
(+va,−vb)ᵀ for 0 ≤ t ≤ T/2
(−va,+vb)ᵀ for T/2 < t ≤ T
. (42)
The cost is similarly bounded from above:
C(Π2) ≤ T
2
8
{−va [fab(vb) + fab(−vb)]+ vb [f ba(va) + f ba(−va)]
+ε
[
2vaf
aa(va) + 2vbf
bb(vb) + vaf
ab(vb)− vafab(−vb) + vbf ba(va)− vbf ba(−va)
]}
.
(43)
Combining the cost of the two strategies with identical parameters va, vb we have
C(Π1) + C(Π2) ≤ T
2
4
{ − va
[
fab(vb) + f
ab(−vb)
]
+ ε
[
4vaf
aa(va) + 4vbf
bb(vb)
+3vaf
ab(vb)− vafab(−vb) + 3vbf ba(va)− vbf ba(−va)
]}
(44)
which is negative for our choice of ε and therefore price manipulation is possible.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Consider a scenario as in Example 3.1, i.e. trading in two
assets over two phases, denoted by I and II, at a constant rate during each phase,
with λ = va,I/vb,I = va,II/vb,II, κ = vi,I/vi,II = vI/vII < 0 and the turn-around point
Θ = T
−vi,II
vi,I−vi,II = T
1
1−κ that is common to both assets. From the single-asset case
we use the result that self-impact is linear and denote this as
f ii(v) = ηiiv (45)
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and for simplicity we assume λ > 0, i.e. trading in the same direction. We define
ε := −1
4
va,If
ab(vb,II)− va,IIfab(vb,I) + vb,If ba(va,II)− vb,IIf ba(va,I)
ηaava,Iva,II + ηbbvb,Ivb,II + va,IIfab(vb,I) + vb,IIf ba(va,I)
(46)
where we are assuming that ε > 0, otherwise we simply replace κ with 1/κ. By
continuity of G as defined in Equation (36) we can choose T = Tε such that cost
can be bounded from above as
C(Π) =
∑
i,j=a,b
CijA + C
ij
B + C
ij
C
≤
∑
i,j=a,b
vi,If
ij(vj,I)
Θ2
2
+ vi,IIf
ij(vj,II)
(T −Θ)2
2
+ vi,IIf
ij(vj,I)(1− ε)Θ(T −Θ)
=
T 2
2
κ
(κ− 1)2
{
va,If
ab(vb,II)− va,IIfab(vb,I) + vb,If ba(va,II)− vb,IIf ba(va,I)
+2ε
[
ηaava,Iva,II + η
bbvb,Ivb,II + va,IIf
ab(vb,I) + vb,IIf
ba(va,I)
]}
=
T 2
4
κ
(κ− 1)2
{
va,If
ab(vb,II)− va,IIfab(vb,I) + vb,If ba(va,II)− vb,IIf ba(va,I)
}
=
T 2
4
κ
(κ− 1)2
{
vI
[
λfab(vII) + f
ba(λvII)
]− vII [λfab(vI) + f ba(λvI)]} (47)
where in the last step we have substituted vb,I = vI, vb,II = vII, va,I = λvI and
va,II = λvII. By our choice of ε this cost is negative unless the auxiliary function
α(v) = λfab(v) + f ba(λv) is linear in v, i.e. α(v) = ηαv. Since this has to hold for
any λ 6= 0, we find that necessarily also fab and f ba need to be linear in the rate of
trading. To prove this last claim we expand α(v) around v = 0 and use Corollary
3.3 that fab(0) = f ba(0) = 0:
α(v) = ηαv = λfab(v) + f ba(λv)
=
∞∑
l=1
(λkabl + λ
lkbal )v
l (48)
This can be linear for any λ only if kabl = k
ba
l = 0 for all l > 1, i.e. if both
cross-impact terms fab(v) and f ba(v) are linear in v.
Proof of Lemma 3.9. Given the parameters ηij determining the strength of self- and
cross-impact and for any va, vb > 0, assuming w.o.l.g. that η
ab > ηba > 0, we choose
ε :=
1
2
vavb
(
ηab − ηba)
2ηaav2a + 2η
bbv2b + 3η
abvavb + ηbavavb
(49)
so that ε > 0.19 Then by our assumption of continuity there exists a Tε > 0 for
which |Gij(0) − Gij(τ)| ≤ ε for all τ with 0 ≤ τ ≤ Tε and for all i, j ∈ {a, b}. We
19We can choose an equivalent ε > 0 in all other cases, i.e. for ηba > ηab > 0 by interchanging
a ↔ b in Equation (49) and below. In the cases that either one or both of ηab and ηba are less
than zero, va and vb are to be chosen such that the denominator in (49) is larger than zero and if
the numerator in (49) is less than zero we interchange a↔ b in order to ensure ε > 0.
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implement the same asymmetric strategy (15) as in Example 3.8 with T = Tε and
calculate the cost of this strategy as C(Π) = Caa +Cbb +Cab +Cba where Caa and
Cbb are the self-impact costs of trading in assets a and b respectively and Cab and
Cba are the costs due to cross-impact from asset b to a and vice versa. The explicit
calculation of the self-impact terms gives
Caa = ηaav2a
{∫ T/3
0
dt
∫ t
0
Gaa(t− s)ds+
∫ T
2T/3
dt
∫ t
2T/3
Gaa(t− s)ds−
∫ T
2T/3
dt
∫ T/3
0
Gaa(t− s)ds
}
≤ ηaav2a
{
T 2
18
+
T 2
18
− (1− ε)T
2
9
}
= εηaav2a
T 2
9
Cbb ≤ εηbbv2b
T 2
9
(50)
and likewise for cross-impact:
Cab = ηabvavb
{
−
∫ T/3
0
dt
∫ t
0
Gab(t− s)ds+
∫ T
2T/3
dt
∫ T/3
0
Gab(t− s)ds−
∫ T
2T/3
dt
∫ 2T/3
T/3
Gab(t− s)ds
}
≤ ηabvavb
{
−(1− ε)T
2
18
+ ε
T 2
9
}
= ηabvavb
T 2
18
(−1 + 3ε)
Cba = ηbavavb
{
−
∫ T/3
0
dt
∫ t
0
Gba(t− s)ds+
∫ 2T/3
T/3
dt
∫ T/3
0
Gba(t− s)ds
}
≤ ηbavavb
{
−(1− ε)T
2
18
+
T 2
9
}
= ηbavavb
T 2
18
(1 + ε) . (51)
Summing over all terms yields
C(Π) ≤ vavbT
2
18
(ηba − ηab) + εT
2
18
(
2ηaav2a + 2η
bbv2b + 3η
abvavb + η
bavavb
)
= vavb
T 2
36
(ηba − ηab)
< 0 (52)
and we conclude that there is a price manipulation unless cross-impact is symmetric,
i.e. we require ηij = ηji.
B Power-law decay and impact
A popular class of unbounded decay kernels are power law kernels, e.g. G(τ) ∼
τ−γ, 0 < γ < 1. Their advantage lies in allowing for more realistic parametrizations
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of the market impact function, such as concave power-law impact f(v) ∼ sgn(v)|v|δ
for 0 < δ < 1. While Gatheral [2010] establishes necessary conditions for such
a model to be consistent in the one-dimensional case, numerical optimizations re-
ported in Curato et al. [2016] find that violations of the principle of no-dynamic-
arbitrage occur even when these conditions are verified, proofing them to be nec-
essary but not sufficient. It remains an open problem whether and under what
conditions power law decay kernels and market impact functions are consistent. In
this section we do not address this question but consider necessary constraints that
arise from the presence of cross-impact. Specifically we show that in this case the
shape parameter of the market impact function f needs to be unique for all self-
and cross-impact terms.
Lemma B.1. Assume a price process as in (2) where decay of market impact G(τ)
is a power law function, i.e. Gij(τ) = τ−γ
ij
with 0 < γij < 1 and f ij(v) =
ηij sgn(v)|v|δij is also power-law with ηij ≥ 0 for all i, j.20 Then absence of dy-
namic arbitrage requires that
δij = δ ∀ i, j . (53)
Proof of Lemma B.1. Consider a strategy of two phases lasting equally long where
at first we build up a position at a constant trading rate from time 0 until time
Θ = T/2 and then liquidate the position in a second phase from T/2 until T , i.e.
Π = {x˙t} , x˙t =
{
(va, vb)
ᵀ for 0 ≤ t ≤ T/2
(−va,−vb)ᵀ for T/2 < t ≤ T
. (54)
which is a special case of Example 3.1. Further we use the notation λ = va/vb.
Explicit calculation of the cost terms due to self-impact yields
Cii = ηiiv1+δ
ii
i
[∫ T/2
0
dt
∫ t
0
dsτ−γ
ii
+
∫ T
T/2
dt
∫ t
T/2
dsτ−γ
ii −
∫ T
T/2
dt
∫ T/2
0
dsτ−γ
ii
]
=
ηiiv1+δ
ii
i
1− γii
[
2
∫ T/2
0
t1−γ
ii
dt−
∫ T
T/2
{
(t− T
2
)1−γ
ii − t1−γii
}
dt
]
=
ηiiv1+δ
ii
i T
2−γii
(1− γii)(2− γii)
[
2γ
ii − 1
]
=: Λii(ηij, γij, T )v1+δ
ii
i (55)
and similarly we obtain for cross-impact
Cij = −ηijvivδijj
[∫ T/2
0
dt
∫ t
0
dsτ−γ
ij
+
∫ T
T/2
dt
∫ t
T/2
dsτ−γ
ij −
∫ T
T/2
dt
∫ T/2
0
dsτ−γ
ij
]
= − η
ijviv
δij
j T
2−γij
(1− γij)(2− γii)
[
2γ
ij − 1
]
=: −Λij(ηij, γij, T )vivδijj (56)
20In the one-dimensional case Gatheral [2010] shows that for absence of dynamic arbitrage it is
also necessary that γ ≥ γ∗ = 2− log 3log 2 ≈ 0.415 and γ + δ ≥ 1.
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with Λij > 0 ∀ ij. Since λ = va/vb we substitute w.o.l.g. va = λv, vb = v. The total
cost of the strategy is thus
C =
∑
ij
Cij
= Λbbv1+δ
bb − λδbaΛbav1+δba − λΛabv1+δab + λ1+δaaΛaav1+δaa
= Λbbv1+δ
bb − λδbaΛbav1+δba +O(λ) (57)
where in the last step we are choosing λ small enough so that linear terms in λ can
be neglected. Then if δbb > δba we can choose v > 0 small enough so that C < 0
and likewise if δbb < δba we can choose v large enough so that there is a price-
manipulation. Therefore we require δbb = δba =: δb and likewise δaa = δab =: δa.
Therefore we can re-express the cost as
C = Λbbv1+δ
b − λδbΛbav1+δa − λΛabv1+δa +O(λ1+δa)
= (Λbb − λδbΛba)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Λb
v1+δ
b − λδaΛbav1+δa +O(λ1+δa) (58)
now also considering linear terms in λ. Since λ is small we can use that Λb > 0
and by the same arguments as above we conclude that absence of arbitrage requires
δa = δb = δ.
C List of ISINs
Table 2 reports basic descriptive statistics and liquidity measures for all the N = 33
bonds that were used for estimations. The set of bonds was selected as all fixed rate
or zero-coupon Italian sovereign bonds with at least 5,000 trades throughout our
sample. Note that some bonds were issued during our sample period and therefore
less than 194 trading days were observed.
The description for each bond lists the bond type (BTPs refers to fixed-income
treasury bonds, CTZ to zero coupon bonds), the fixed interest rate (where appli-
cable) and the maturity date. Maturity is the time from issuance of a bond to the
maturity date in years and time-to-maturity is calculated as the remaining time
from the end of our sample (October 16, 2015) to the maturity date. The trade
volume measures in Table 2 (mean traded volume per day and mean volume per
trade) are reported as face volume traded and to arrive at the value one has to mul-
tiply by the price. The liquidity measures of the limit order book (mean number
of limit order book updates per day, mean spread and ratio of tick size over mean
spread) are computed from 10:00 to 17:00 of each day as we restrict our analysis to
this period to avoid intraday seasonalities. Bid-ask spread is given in units of basis
points of the face value, e.g. an average spread 14.9bp corresponds to a contract
with a standard face value of EUR 100 offered at a mean spread of 14.9 euro-cents.
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IT0001278511 BTPS 5.250 01/11/29 31.0 14.1 194 108.8 5.5 50.3 31.4 14.9 0.07
IT0003535157 BTPS 5.000 01/08/34 31.0 18.8 194 103.3 5.5 52.9 44.3 22.7 0.04
IT0003934657 BTPS 4.000 01/02/37 31.5 21.3 194 882.1 66.5 75.4 31.0 5.5 0.18
IT0004009673 BTPS 3.750 01/08/21 15.5 5.8 194 84.4 5.8 68.5 18.5 5.6 0.18
IT0004019581 BTPS 3.750 01/08/16 10.4 0.8 194 29.2 1.8 60.5 4.9 2.3 0.04
IT0004164775 BTPS 4.000 01/02/17 10.1 1.3 194 22.8 1.5 67.8 3.2 3.7 0.03
IT0004361041 BTPS 4.500 01/08/18 10.3 2.8 194 23.3 2.6 111.9 6.8 5.1 0.20
IT0004423957 BTPS 4.500 01/03/19 10.5 3.4 194 22.4 2.4 108.1 10.8 5.6 0.18
IT0004489610 BTPS 4.250 01/09/19 10.3 3.9 194 42.7 4.1 95.6 12.2 5.7 0.18
IT0004532559 BTPS 5.000 01/09/40 31.0 24.9 194 179.3 10.6 59.1 35.0 17.6 0.06
IT0004536949 BTPS 4.250 01/03/20 10.4 4.4 194 41.2 6.7 162.8 14.3 5.9 0.17
IT0004594930 BTPS 4.000 01/09/20 10.4 4.9 194 57.6 5.1 89.3 15.9 5.8 0.17
IT0004634132 BTPS 3.750 01/03/21 10.5 5.4 194 49.3 4.2 85.3 18.0 6.1 0.16
IT0004695075 BTPS 4.750 01/09/21 10.5 5.9 194 25.3 2.3 89.7 17.8 6.7 0.15
IT0004759673 BTPS 5.000 01/03/22 10.5 6.4 194 30.7 3.1 99.9 18.1 7.5 0.13
IT0004801541 BTPS 5.500 01/09/22 10.5 6.9 194 25.2 2.3 91.4 19.0 8.3 0.12
IT0004848831 BTPS 5.500 01/11/22 10.2 7.0 194 20.9 2.2 107.2 16.8 8.7 0.11
IT0004898034 BTPS 4.500 01/05/23 10.2 7.5 194 35.1 3.6 101.4 18.8 8.3 0.12
IT0004923998 BTPS 4.750 01/09/44 31.3 28.9 194 252.9 18.7 73.9 33.1 15.4 0.07
IT0004953417 BTPS 4.500 01/03/24 10.6 8.4 194 50.9 9.2 180.0 23.4 5.5 0.18
IT0005001547 BTPS 3.750 01/09/24 10.5 8.9 194 47.1 7.3 154.7 22.5 6.5 0.15
IT0005024234 BTPS 3.500 01/03/30 15.8 14.4 194 257.3 22.6 87.8 27.2 9.3 0.11
IT0005028003 BTPS 2.150 15/12/21 7.5 6.2 194 83.1 14.4 173.0 16.7 4.7 0.21
IT0005030504 BTPS 1.500 01/08/19 5.1 3.8 194 25.8 6.7 258.5 10.5 5.4 0.18
IT0005044976 CTZ 14- 30/08/16 24M 2.0 0.9 194 31.8 4.3 135.3 2.5 1.7 0.06
IT0005045270 BTPS 2.500 01/12/24 10.3 9.1 194 202.1 29.0 143.7 25.7 4.4 0.23
IT0005069395 BTPS 1.050 01/12/19 5.0 4.1 194 74.6 14.2 190.3 11.2 4.2 0.24
IT0005083057 BTPS 3.250 01/09/46 31.6 30.9 163 892.4 78.3 87.7 31.4 6.1 0.16
IT0005086886 BTPS 1.350 15/04/22 7.2 6.5 145 124.1 16.5 133.1 18.0 4.7 0.21
IT0005090318 BTPS 1.500 01/06/25 10.3 9.6 135 332.7 36.8 110.7 28.3 4.3 0.23
IT0005094088 BTPS 1.650 01/03/32 17.0 16.4 134 603.3 41.4 68.7 22.9 6.1 0.16
IT0005107708 BTPS 0.700 01/05/20 5.0 4.5 121 65.5 11.7 178.6 12.3 5.6 0.18
IT0005127086 BTPS 2.000 01/12/25 10.3 10.1 35 174.8 14.6 83.3 18.6 3.8 0.26
Table 2: Descriptives and liquidity measures for the set of bonds used in estimation.
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